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Introduction 
The euro-crisis has provoked a widespread social crisis in the peripheral regions of the Euro-zone.  
This crisis, tied with rising mass protests and technocratic governance across these areas, has 
brought with it a serious problem of legitimacy for democratic institutions. My research assumes that 
the crisis created divergent views of democracy among the protestors and those responsible for 
implementing austerity measures. 
Therefore, it will study the different views of democracy in Portugal, arising out of the current 
environment of social conflict, particularly from government representatives, the troika, and 
protestors. Whereas protestors associate democracy with social rights, equality and the Portuguese 
revolution,  government representatives generally associate democracy with voting and governing 
procedures. 
The divergence of belief systems rotating the poles of social conflict explains why democracy seems 
to be an empty concept in a period of crisis and it suffers from a loss of legitimacy. It may explain 
how it is that some institutions are considered democratic by one side, and at the same time, anti-
democratic- and thus legitimate to be overthrown or neglected- by another. This helps explain why in 
the existing literature on democratic theory there is no useful compromise to be found between the 
substantive and procedural approaches and why democracy can disappear, even when people 
appear certain that they are defending democracy. 
These conclusions could provide a new theoretical framework for democratic theory and 
address the various weaknesses in current mainstream models. Diverging democratic 
theories, and the phenomenon where one seeks dominance over another, could then be 
explained to reflect the social struggles and the adjacent power relations. If the hypothesis is 
to be confirmed. It would raise a number of other issues of consequence for science and 
democratic theory. This would mean the end of “objective” democratic models. The choice 
of a given democratic model would imply a clear positioning in social struggles where it is 
applied, and therefore would raise the question about the role of academic democratic 
theory in the social conflict. 
It is important to analyze the narratives of the executives and the protesters separately; 
constructing narratives and analyzing their internal consistencies and heterogeneities. The 
main purpose of this paper is to make a partial analysis of the policy-legitimizing discourses of the 
political-economic executive in Portugal, linking this democratic legitimation to democratic theory. 
The first parts of this article, is a brief sketch of the state of art of democratic theory. Then I will apply 
it to the contemporary executive discourse in through an empirical study in which we will try to show 
the application of this framework, discussing 4 cases; the TINA discourse, the government member’s 
reactions  about the “grandoladas”, the speech of the prime minister addressing the judgement of 
inconstitutionality of the budget by the constitutional court and an interview with a high 
representative of the Troika. 
State of art 
Within the context of the Euro-crisis and the European austerity-policies, the question of 
democracy becomes increasingly problematic. As with previous systemic crises, in the 
present, the crisis does not only affect the legitimacy of existing governance systems, it also 
tests the established models of democratic theory and the potential for new ones. While 
some authors, like Bosco(2012) or McGiffen (2011) have been warning about the dangers of 
what would be considered a “democracy without choices”, or “a bloodless coup d’etat” in 
the Euro-zone, the appearance of new social movements and rising protests are claiming the 
banners of “real democracy” in peripheral European countries. This research attempts to 
bring a new approach to democratic theory based on the crisis in the Euro-zone. 
According to mainstream literature on democratic theory and its interpretation of the crisis 
of legitimacy being experienced by European institutions, (Scharpf 2012; Schmidt 2010),  
simply put, is a matter of having different “dimensions” of democracy (Rosanvallon 2008; 
Cheibub e.a. 2009; Shapiro 2005). A number of theorists distinguish the inputs, output and 
other dimensions of democracy, with a view to make a “compromise” and “complexify” 
classical and competitive approaches. This research argues that this compromise is not 
possible, as it is born in the social struggles themselves, making these models no more than 
interesting thought experiments. 
More empiric, positivist approaches, particularly comparative politics approaches, have been 
influenced by Lipset’s(1959) requisites for democracy. Authors such as Huntington(1991) 
and Przeworski(2000), have used empirical studies to demonstrate how economic 
development affect democratic legitimacy. These approaches are very popular in 
contemporary political science. A fundamental problem with these theoretical paradigmatic 
models is that they are based on arbitrary definitions of democracy. (Cheibub e.a. 2009) 
These have been applied in a number of countries and/or historical epochs. This is 
problematic given that it is exactly the definition which is questioned in a crisis situation. 
Post-modern critical theory neglects the historical and social groundings of democracy, 
concentrating  on consensus, non-class ‘differences’, minimizing, neglecting or trying to 
overcome the role of class conflicts as central to the reproduction of governance in a 
capitalist system. (Miguel, 2012) Schools of deliberative democracy (eg Benhabib 1996), and 
participative democracy (eg Santos 1998), through their moral-based critics/ideas of 
democratic theory, tend to be primarily idealist, prescriptive and utopian.  
The original critical tradition engaged with the socio-historical phenomenon of democracy as 
we know it, as a product of capitalist development and bourgeois society (Schumpeter 1976; 
Habermas 1975) For these authors, the historical interaction between capitalism, class 
structures and democracy is crucial; an approach which is particularly useful in our troubled 
times. Inspired by these authors, some authors have stressed the importance of the new 
social protest movements, such as the counter-hegemonic globalization movement (Santos 
2000), the occupy-movement (Chomsky 2012), and the anti-austerity-movement (Douzinas 
2010), as possible social driving forces, representing the new ‘real’ and ‘radical’ processes of 
democratization. Such movements always bring new “conflicts hitherto restricted to  the 
private sphere into the public sphere” (J. Habermas e.a. 1974, p.44). In contrast to authors of 
the agonist school, such as Mouffe (2000), celebrating these internal conflicts as “true” 
democracy from a moral point of view, this research anticipates that these social conflicts 
will ultimately lead to a legitimation crisis  (Habermas 1975). Slavoj Zizek (2006 p37) provides 
a crucial insight for this research when he proposes that today’s “struggle for democracy … is 
in what it will mean”; and thus that the social struggle will decide “which kind of democracy 
will hegemonize the universal notion”. 
We have seen how there exists an array of contemporary contradictions between the 
different interpretations of democracy. Even certain works renowned for their overviews of 
the subject (Shapiro 2005; Held 2006) have failed to overcome these contradictions. One of 
the problems is that mainstream and post-modern critical literature neglects the historical 
and dialectic relationship between the structural conflicts of capitalism and democracy. 
Therefore, the old critical and Marxist traditions, that approach democracy as a part of the 
ideological superstructure of society, provide a better explanation for today’s crisis of 
democratic legitimacy as a consequence of the euro-crisis. This research assumes that the 
answer lies in adopting a dialectic materialist approach to engage with the social 
relationships established between the different models, and their connection with the 
reproduction of capitalism and resultant crises. From the analysis of the particular case of 
Portugal within the context of the euro-crisis we try to build a universal model of the 
models. 
According to the marxist tradition, democracy has evolved together with capitalism. The 
accumulation process, which forms the main engine for social interaction under the 
capitalist logic, reproduces unequal exchanges and inequalities. Unequal exchanges however 
cannot operate outside or beyond their political context; they tend to provoke opposition, 
which creates the need for capitalism to legitimize itself as a system organizing social 
relations. 
Legitimacy as the notion of “the right to govern”, (Bodansky 1999) always rests on the 
shared acceptance of rules and rule by affected communities and on justificatory norms 
recognized by the relevant community. As such, it is founded in a collective audience’s 
shared belief, that ‘the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ (Bernstein 2004) It is 
part of an ideological construction, that “the existing political organization is the most 
appropriate” and makes existing power-relations acceptable. (Lipset 1959)  
Since the ascendance of capitalism, democracy has been one of the central pillars in the 
legitimation of the social system, both institutionally and as a discourse. The early bourgeois 
democratic institutions developed together with the need of the kings to legitimize their 
expenses for the national “common good”, the newly developing capitalist classes 
demanded representation for their taxation. 
The relation between capitalism and democracy however, is not straightforward, but one of 
antagonisms; as democracy itself is the product of continuous struggles within the capitalist 
system. As Vivek Chibber (2013) portrays, Western liberal democracy is a product of anti-
liberal opposition. This relation of contradiction is inherently a conflict of distribution of 
value. (Santos 2013 Visao 30/5) The need for legitimation needs the use of value that cannot 
therefore be accumulated and reinvested for accumulation, and therefore restricts the 
possibilities for accumulation.  (Paterson 2010, p.349) These contradictions provoke the 
tension between accumulation and legitimation central to the reproduction of capitalist 
societies (Paterson 2010). 
In the modern Portuguese society, democracy has a special place, both institutionally and 
ideologically. The overthrow of the authoritarian Salazarist regime by the carnation 
revolution in 1974, and the subsequent political crisis-period (PREC – Processo 
revolucionario em curso: Revolutionary process in the making), marked by violent political 
confrontations, collectivization’s and changing power relations has only been surpassed 
through the slow reconstitution of the state a new democratic regime after 1976. This 
democratic regime, initially based on a trans-class character and legal order, (Santos, 1992, 
p36) contrasted with the previous regime of authoritarianism, as well as the revolutionary 
PREC. The revolutionary period coincided with an unusually strong position of the working 
class, and this balance of interclass power of the revolutionary crisis has been transferred 
into the state. It integrated parts of the old regime, the economic and the left, as it also 
respected the nationalization, the agriculture reforms, as well as the existence of the 
Portuguese Communist party and the parties on its left, as being part of a new legal 
democratic order. This democratic order is the basis of a new social and political hegemony 
in Portuguese society. (Santos, p36, 37). Although the political elite always found it difficult 
to achieve such a hegemony, particularly because the Portuguese bourgeoisie never aspired 
this hegemonic role; adapting to its peripheral status and dependence on foreign capital; the 
democratic legitimacy remained has always remained intact (Santos 253-257), it is the 
master signifier in the current ideology.  
Portugal´s admission into the EU and the Eurozone brought with it a period of financial 
stability and rapid economic development. This enhanced social stability, met by a period of 
steady democracy, equal to the experience of other peripheral countries. The design of the 
European model, however, created its own imbalances and is responsible for the recent 
social and economic crisis in these countries. (Hadjimichalis 2011; De Grauwe 2010) Portugal 
has been severely affected by the euro-crisis and the austerity measures imposed by troika. 
Today’s social conflict creates specific difficulties for democracy as the ideological signifier. 
Diversified mass protests have been a direct response to the crisis being felt overall in 
Portugal. There have been four general strikes organized by the unions.  New, less 
institutionalized mass movements are on the rise, such as the indignados, the 15-O 
movement and “Que se lixe a Troika” which brought hundreds of thousands of people to the 
streets. Each of these groups, uphold different discourses on democracy. Some are 
embedded in historical experiences, pointing to “values of the April revolution”, others are 
inspired by the global occupy movement. Although all players still frame their interest 
according to democracy; the meaning the give to it begins to differ. The crisis is threatening 
the country´s democratic stability with public confidence in democracy at an all-time low.  
Here Slavoj Zizek’s (2006, p.7) new interpretation of dialectical materialist approach is 
helpfull. Zizek uses a lacanian inspired approach to ideology where legitimacy is based on a 
master-signifier; an object that gives meaning, but whose ideological meaning is determined 
by the social struggle and power relations. If we use his method of analysis, the political - as 
well as politico-theoretical - gap between the different models, dimensions and narratives of 
democracy could be described as a “parallax gap”. Our parallax gap – the meaning of 
democracy - is an empty signifier; whose emptiness is a consequence of rising social 
antagonisms. Such a parallax gap is insurmountable, particularly in an economic crisis, where 
social contradictions and struggles erupt. Instead of trying to overcome the gap, and define 
democracy, we should conceive its becoming. 
Zizek’s conclusion is that the essence of today’s democratic struggle is about its very 
meaning. Historically this assumption finds a clear conceptual precedence in the old Marxist 
nineteenth century dichotomy between the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and “bourgeois 
democracy”. This research adapts, actualizes, and redefines these old Marxist concepts to 
twenty-first century Europe. In the rest of this paper we will focus specifically on one 
interpretation of the democratic signifier, namely the contemporary political-economic elite 
discourse of democracy; the neoliberal democratic narrative which used to be the 
hegemonic one. 
The elite discourse 
This part will analyze two tendencies of legitimating discourse by the elite. One is the 
depolitization of the inequalities, the sphere of the economy and therefore limiting the 
sphere where political and substantive democratic legitimation is needed. This is the 
tendency to establish and strengthen private spheres, which are not subject to democratic 
decisions: such as the (free) depoliticized markets (Habermas) which is restricts the public 
sphere as much as possible. When this tendency is reproduced in discourse will call this the 
(neo)liberal aspect of the discourse. On the other hand the tendency to legitimize public 
policies within the public sphere as much as possible on the base of democratic procedures, 
in limit the democratic substance as much as possible. This second tendency is 
institutionalized by a tendency towards a minimalist, formal Schumpeterian-based model for 
democracy. We will call this the formalist aspect of the discourse. 
Within the neoliberal era, an era of defeat of the power of organized labour worldwide and a 
balance of power strongly in favor of capital, these tendencies have strengthened. 
Democracy as signifier has had the tendency to acquire a neoliberal meaning. Under the 
Washinton Consensus, substantive legitimation of the system (Paterson 2010) , would partly 
be provided by higher growth rates entailed by globalization and market liberalization - 
according to the legitimizing neoliberal ideology: - “while politics shrinks, the economy 
grows” (Bello 2006, p.16). The people of the world were offered a piece of capitalism, as 
everyone was encouraged to become rentier, and while the rates of exploitation had risen 
and social benefits were cut down, they could grab a chunk of the profits created by it. 
(Graeber 2011, p.376) 
The neoliberal discourse has been the dominant legitimizing economic discourse in recent 
decades. Neoliberalism is the political en ideological doctrine developed by the political and 
economic elites to overcome the crisis of the 1970’s (Mylonas 2012 p 648) It “is a discourse 
which is backed by the strength of all the economic and social forces (the banks, the 
multinational companies, politicians, and so on) who are trying to make flexibility — the new 
global capitalism — even more of a reality than it already is. Neoliberal discourse contributes 
its own particular, symbolic, form of strength to the strength of these social forces.” 
(fairclough p72) So, although it has become hegemonic today, in so far that it is considered 
as an appeal to common sense, (Blommaert) “discourses are partial and positioned, and 
social difference is manifest in the diversity of discourses within particular social practices. 
Neoliberal economic discourse, for instance, is only one of many economic discourses and, 
as I have indicated earlier, it corresponds to a specific perspective and set of 
interests.”(Fairclough, p77) 
The neoliberal discourse includes the prescription of deregulation of economic activity, 
privatizations, reductions of social and public spending, reductions of taxation aggressive 
competition and flexible labour conditions. It is a reaction against the Keynesian welfare 
state economics and find its theoretical base in the Chicago School of political economy, 
such as von Hayek, Friedman, et al. (Brown 2003) In popular usage, neo-liberalism is equated 
with a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through 
economic de-regulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies 
favorable to business, linked to the vicissitudes of globalization or to International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank policies .(W. Brown 2003) 
People opposing neoliberalism claim the neoliberal framework of ideas and discourses is 
“indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource 
depletion and environmental destruction” and tha its economic policies sustain or deepen 
local poverty and the subordination of peripheral to core nations, but also because it is 
compatible with, and sometimes even productive of, authoritarian, despotic, paramilitaristic, 
and/or corrupt state forms and agents within civil society.” 
Several authors have therefore developed the idea of a process of depolitization which 
would be central to the neoliberal rethoric (Zizek, Mouffe, Habermas) “It is part of a widely 
observed narrowing down of the political spectrum — parties are becoming increasingly 
similar in their policies, and the differences between them are increasingly differences of 
style. … the predominance of a single economic-political discourse across the political 
spectrum. (fairclough 78)” 
Whereas it could be expected that the logic of enterprise rhetoric would be under strain in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. (p4 O’ROURKE and Hogan,2012) The market driven 
neoliberal discourse did not weaken. O’Rourke and Hogan’s (2012?) case study of 
entreprise-driven discourses during the financial crisis in Ireland, for example, reached this 
conclusion analysing interviews with the Irish minister of Finances, who consistently built his 
discourse on the separation of the market issues and political issues, strengthening the 
depoliticized through the crisis situation. 
Mylonas and Zizek point towards depoliticizing discourse on the nature of the crisis for 
example. (Zizek apud Mylonas 2010) One of the first elements of this is the characterization 
of the Eurozone crisis as a debt-crisis, (Mylonas 2012)  a crisis of bad public governance; 
whereas the capitalist crisis, the role of the financial markets, the role of the monetary 
choices and unequalities is fundamentally ignored. (O’Rourke and Hogan) It transfers the 
structural responsibility of capitalism for the socio-economic failures towards the state, 
“overconsuming” citizens and government. In O’Rourke and Hogan’s study everyday 
spending on state services is framed as something political, whereas guaranteeing lending to 
Irish banks seems to be a reality imposed by the markets. People advocating alternatives, 
“have no realistic proposals” (O’Rourke and Hogan  p15)  
One of the aspects of this depoliticizing discours is the culturalization of Politics. 
Brown(2008)  and Mandani define “culturalisation of politics as a discoursive process that 
reduces every culture to “a tangible essence that defines it and explains politics as a 
consequence of that essence”. (Mamdani 2005, p.17) This process “analytically vanquishes 
political economy, states, history, and international and transnational relations. It eliminates 
colonialism, capital, caste or class stratification, and external political domination from 
accounts of political conflict or instability.” (Brown 2008, p.20) At the same time that it 
divests liberal democratic institutions of any association with culture, (Brown 2008) ignoring 
liberalism is culture; the culture of the dominant classes in the core of the world system. The 
presented solution for the wrong political-economic “culture” that led to the exceptional 
state, is litteraly to “liberalize” it, through privatization, indivualization, transparency and 
political reform. It is within this context one should think of concepts as “a new political 
culture”, a new work-ethic, flexibilization of labour, anti-corruption, making the state more 
efficient, etc… These “cultural” explanations - which originated in north-European prejudices 
and are compatible with neoliberal discourse - include attributing the exceptional state of 
the southern economies to the idea that they would have lived “above their standards”. 
(Mylonas 2012) This in turn is attributed to cultural prejudices as laziness, non-productivity, 
wasteful spending and lying, forming a “Mediterranean mix of indiscipline, extravagance and 
outright corruption” (Bohle 2010). 
The recent financial crisis and the consequent social conflicts in the Eurozone have 
strengthened these discursive tendencies in the peripheral countries of the Euro-zone. The 
rhetoric of austerity accompanies the structural adjustment reforms. These are particularly 
influenced by northern, traditionally protestant; countries of the Eurozone; Germany and 
the Netherlands, which according to Max Weber originated the ethics of capitalism. This 
rhetoric  was primarily used to strengthen the arguments to legitimize the imposed cuts in 
order to save their own banks and save the common currency. This “help” was portrayed 
and broadly perceived as a transfer from Core working class taxpayers to Peripheral corrupt 
states and their “lazy, lying” populations, although it was a transfer from mainly core 
working class taxpayers, in the form of state warrants, to mainly core banks. 
The policies of the memorandum of the Troika include a reduction of the state and its 
budget, a reduction of voters sovereignty trough foreign and European control on policies, 
privatization of important public services… which all reduce the sphere of influence of the 
public. At the same time the external supervision by the Troika, the stricter control by the 
European Comission on the national budgets, and the rising dependence of the ECB for 
financing, has led to decreasing of the room for political maneuver of the national political 
actors. The implementation of the so-called six-pack gives a veto-right on the national 
budget to the European commission, even before the national parliaments can vote them. 
The consequence is that the democratic institutions themselves are totally de-substanciated.  
Given the importance of democracy as symbolic institution and as a legitimizing discourse 
and practice; in particular also in the Portuguese situation; the elites have developed a 
rhetoric and institutionalisation restricts the potential substantive influence of the public 
without taking the subjects out of the public sphere. This tendency is embodied by a 
tendency to limit democracy and discourse about democracy to formalist procedures. 
Meaning that people get a “regular chance to vote but not to choose.” (Przeworski 1991, 
p.187) 
The theoretical background of this formalist rhetoric is based on Schumpeter minimalist 
theory of democracy. In an attempt to constitute a an “aplicable model of democracy” 
Schumpeter reduces democracy to a method of electoral competition, instead of an end in 
itself. Democracy becomes just a method to legitimate policy, by competition for votes 
between different political players. The role of the people is to “produce a government”, 
acceptance of leadership as the true function of vote. This leaves room for the vital role of 
leadership and theoretically would enable group-wise volitions to be formed and 
represented by leaders competing for votes, for whom the votes are an electoral incentive 
for good governance. (Schumpeter 1976) In a defense of this approach, Przeworski defines 
democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections”(Przeworski 1991, p.10). The 
minimalist approach presupposes regime and policy change and conflict between interests 
without violence and bloodshed, because the mere prospect that government may change 
can result in peaceful regulations of conflicts. Moreover, voting authorizes coercion; it 
constitutes “flexing muscles”, as the majority represents a power relation and coincides with 
the physical force of the citizens. The electoral process generates the information of this 
power relation. (Przeworski 1999, p.39)  
This formal legitimation means that the government legitimizes its policies purely on the 
base that it has been democratically elected and is supported by a parliamentary majority, 
that it has the powers of the executive untill the end of the legislature, and resistance 
against it policies therefore doesn’t respect democracy. It limits democracy to voting 
procedures, rule of law, freedom of expression, etc... 
There is not necessarily a clear distinction between both tendencies and they act together. 
Even though the governement legitimizes itself on the base of its election results, it still 
legitimizes its policies on the basis that there is no alternative. Together this lead to a 
discourse that could be called low-intensity democracy (Santos). 
Case studies 
Through the next section we will try to observe the elements of these dominant democratic 
discourses of austerity in 4 discursive cases. First we will give some examples of the dominant theme 
of TINA within the legitimizing discourse. Afterwards we will analyse the arguments made by the 
“victims” of the grandoladas protests. Third we will draw the rethoric of the Prime minister about the 
decision of the constitutional court about the budget. And fourth I will highlight some passages from 
an interview I had with a representative from the Troika. 
I General discourse of “There is no Alternative” 
Since the beginning of the crisis, one of the strongest tendencies to legitimize the austerity 
measures, was to say that “There was no Alternative”. Reproducing the famous Tatcherite rhetoric, 
the executive used the discourse about financial markets, European procedures and economic “laws” 
to any discredit all other political options. 
On 14 okotber 2011 the ex-president of the PSD, Marcelo Rebelo Sousa affirms that “In the situation 
we have gotten in, there is no alternative to control the deficit and the public debt” (Expresso, 2011). 
One month later the minister of parliamentary affairs says to understand the frustration of the 
Portuguese people, but defended that “there is no alternative” to the path the government is 
following. Relvas states that “during the last years we have spent what we had and what we had not, 
we let unemployment boom, we let public debt increase and the measures that are being taken, are 
reformist and have the objective to correct the path that has been followed over the last years”. 
(TSF, 24 nov 2011) He repeats this the next month when he is questioned about the installation of 
new tollways: “the Portuguese have to understand that the government has no alternatives to the 
introduction of tollways, as it is forced to “pay the debts others have assumed”. Relvas recognizes 
that these are “difficult times” but “there is no alternative”. (DN, 14 dec 2011) 
The same rhetoric is repeated by the president of the European Commission, when on 13 of March 
2012, expressed his confidence in the “wisdom” and the “good sense” of the Portuguese. “The 
people can disagree on this or that measure, but in the end, they know there is no alternative to the 
path of budgetary consolidation and structural reforms. The enormous majority of the people know 
this”, said Barroso to the Portuguese journalists in Strasbourg, in the margin of the plenary session of 
the European parliament. (DN, 13 mar 2012) 
The same message is given to the social partners; as for example in a meeting between the prime 
minister and the social partners, in the scope of the European council, which had been “marked with 
worries of the employers and the trade-unions regarding the next state budget for 2013. At the exit, 
Passos and the rest of the members of the government avoided the journalists, but some social 
partners explained that the executive reinforced that there is no other path than that of austerity.” 
(TSF, 12 oct 2012) 
This rhetoric is reforced by economists supporting the government’s policies:: “But is there any 
alternative to austerity?” This is how Teodora Cardoso, president of the Council of Public finances, 
answer starts her answer to an interpelation of PS member of parliament Joao galamba. For the 
president, there is no other path to be followed, warning that any “alternative to austerity implies 
more financing, and more financing means more debt.” (Noticias ao minuto, 8 nov 2012, DN 8 nov 
2012) For Teodora Cardoso, there is no-one conceding this financing, “these possibilities have been 
used up, wheter on the side of the markets, wheter on the side of official financing”, she said, any 
kind of increase of debt “means aggravating the problems of the economy” (Noticias ao minuto, 8 
nov 2012) In Jornal De Negocios, economist Vitor Bento stressed that “there is no alternative to 
austerity”, as in Portugal, “since 1995 we have been increasing the gap between internal spending 
and the income we got, which means that the difference only can be sustained if there is someone 
financing that difference, with external money.”(Jornal Negocios, 13 feb 2013)  
II Reactions to the Grandoladas 
The grandoladas have been a new form of protest. Grandolar was the new word, a verb, invented to 
designate the anti-austerity protest-activity of singing “Grandola” during political speeches of 
representatives of the executive. Grandola is a song  bij José (Zeca) Afonso, an iconic Portuguese 
singer known for his protest songs and firmly linked to the Carnation revolution. Particularly his 
“Grandola, Vila Morena”, has a very strong symbolic meaning linked with democracy, freedom and 
equality, as it was one of the two heroic songs used to announce the military coup which started the 
revolution. Grandola is the song about a small town in the Alentejo region, the poor, hot and dry 
region south of Lisbon. It’s inequalities, fruit of the economic relations based on big land-ownership, 
latifundios, have historically strengthened social struggles and the political left in the Area. Since 
1974 “Grandola” transformed itself in a kind of hymn of liberation and is traditionally sung at 
commemorations of the Portuguese Revolution.  Today protestors have begun to use this song as a 
manner of protest. Since the 15th of February, and in particular at the initiative of the QSLT-
movement (Que se Lixe a Troika)in the week before the 2nd of March demonstration, protestors 
managed to dirsturb at least a dozen times the speeches of members of Portuguese government by 
singing Grandola. It’s symbolic meaning concerning democracy provides it an enigmatic case to 
analyze the discursive reaction by the executive to these protest actions. 
Although on several occasions the ministers and state secretaries did not react publicly in the media 
about the incidents, when there were reactions, they could be linked to a procedural view of 
democracy. This was done in two ways; on the one hand some just let pass the protest, said that it 
was part of the protestors freedom of speech, but that their policies would continue, as the executive 
had been legitimized by the elections. On the other hand, the protestors were attacked as not 
respecting the procedures of a democracy, and even of not respecting the freedom of speech of the 
executive. 
Then Minister of parliamentary affairs, Miguel Relvas, reacted to one of the grandoladas that “this 
government is only leaving in 2015 if the Portuguese would want it,” and “the results will talk for us 
at the end of the legislature”. As a reaction to one of the Grandoladas in the parliament, the 
president of the parliament, Assunção Esteves, for example claimed of the protestors that “you are 
not helping democracy”, while police agents dragged them out. At another occasion she stated to 
the singers that “one cannot dissolve democracy, if not, we would not be in a democratic order, we 
would be in a revolution”. At one of the protests against finance minister, Vitor Gaspar, Miguel Pinto 
Luz, leader of PSD-Lisbon declared: “This government does not govern based on opion-polls. Let 
them govern” 
Another part of the discourse is to relate the protests as irrational. Within the logic of “Tina”. When 
Christine Lagarde for example was confronted with a Grandolada in Amsterdam she said: “As I said 
before, what we want is stability, and that is what is missing to discuss these issues in a clear way.” 
At the same time, while the protesters were led out by the security, she urged to accelerate the 
structural reforms. This irrationality is afterwards, in a Habermasian way, linked with a basic 
imperatives of democracy. In a reaction to the grandoladas, Prime minister Pedro Passos Coelho for 
example affirmed that “the resistance against the seduction of terrible simplifications is a democratic 
imperative”. According to him “we should not accept that the sacrifices, the difficulties and the 
sentiments of the people in Portugal and in other European countries would be kidnapped by 
irrational proposals that don’t think about the future and by promises that are never realistic 
alternatives with a beginning middle and end”, and “not only can anyone claim the monopoly of 
consternation towards the difficulties and the hardships of the people, also indignation is not enough 
to constitute a political answer to the crisis”. 
There is also an interesting opposition between the self-portrayal of the executive speakers as 
victims, while at the same time using physical force, in the form of police, security, the moderators 
and the law and procedures against their opponents. Prime minister Coelho for example claimed that 
“in a discussion conducted through screams, it are always those with less voice that lose more, and 
less voice does not necessarily mean less reason”, suggesting himself as the one with less voice. 
III The Prime Minister vs Constitutional Court 
The collision between the prime minister and the constitutional court was another interesting 
example of neoliberal discourse, democratic legitimation, restricting it to the formal democratic 
procedures. And how even here policymakers have dificulty with the substantial elements of 
democracy in a time of economic crisis. On friday the 5th of april 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that several austerity measures in the 2013 budget violated the constitutional principles of 
proportionality and equality under law. Specifically, it concerned the abolition of the holiday-
allowances of public servants and pensioners, the introduction of income tax on sickness and 
unemployment benefits and the reduction of the employment status of researchers. Other austerity 
measures worth 4.4 billion have stood the test well, including the tax on pensions, the reduction of 
wages in the public sector and the increase in income. As a result the government had to find 1.3 
billion euro elsewhere. The European Commission immediately responded that the judgment of the 
Court cancels all previous agreements. The next tranche of 2.1 billion "aid" from the Troika, who 
early last month was guaranteed by the Troika, is placed "on hold”. Portugal agreed to present an 
additional 1.3 billion saving until the end of April adding to the  2.0 billion agreed in March. At the 
same time delegations of the Troika were sent back to Lisbon, less than a month since the previous 
mission. 
The Prime minister responded to this decision by reiterating the neoliberal discourse about necessity 
of new social cuts. While formally defending democratic procedures and values he nevertheless gave 
a warning to the constitutional court:  
In our political regime, it competes to the Constitutional Court to make a sovereign 
interpretation of the constitution. It is evident that the government respects and will comply 
with the decisions of the constitutional court. I could not be otherwise in a democratic state of 
law that respects its institution. But the government disagrees with the interpretation of the 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic made by the Court, and turned public in the court’s 
judgment two days ago…We all share the same constitutional values, but our interpretation 
of the context, hierarchy and concrete application of these values is not the one exposed in 
the Constitutional court. The exceptional condition of the country and the degradation of the 
European situation, demands to all a great realism and a sharp consciousness about the 
imperatives and the restrictions imposed by the circumstances, which this government didn’t 
chose but just inherited. In exceptional times nations can have need of exceptional answers, 
such is our case. If these answers could not be found, the important values the Constitution 
establishes, may be at issue, in a much greater way. (Passos Coelho, 7/04/2013) 
 
The judgement “turns the position of Portugal fragile”, it “creates uncertainty and unpredictability 
within a process which is already very demanding”. The decision of the CC “constitutes a risk” for the 
process of economic assistance”. It will difficult the lives of the Portuguese and the success of 
national recuperation will be made problematic. It has created budget imbalances which require 
concrete acts. 
He defends and legitimizes further auterity policies again on the base of a neoliberal legitimation 
rhetoric on the one hand and the usage of a formalistic interpretation of democracy on the other.  
The neoliberal legitimation of the policy choices is based on the ideas of the urgency and 
exceptionality of the situation and on depoliticizing principles of good governance and TINA. 
Neoliberal rhetoric 
During his speech for example he presented of the situation as “exceptional”, particularly because of 
the “exceptional condition of the country and the degradation of the European situation”. He 
emphasized that the government does not want to make these choices but regarding the 
“circumstances”, there is the “need to recover credibility”, which means further cuts would be 
“necessary”.  
To legitimize these necessary policies he emphasized that any other discursive alternatives 
“defending the social welfarestate” by framing them as “easy demagogy”, “demagogies” or “tactics,” 
equalizing them with bad governance. 
Contrary to impossible alternatives, there is a need for “clarity and realism”. He therefore engages 
other parties, to discuss “possible alternatives”, as “these national objectives overtake the political 
colors”. Nevertheless he further restricts this engagement to the parties of the “range of 
governmentability”, as long as they are “reasonable, fundamentally objective”. According to him, this 
restricts the “alternatives to either “new taxes” (which the government does not accept) or a 
“second bailout” with another, lengthened and harder (austerity-)program. As any of these 
alternatives would thus be “worse”, the conclusion is reproduction of  the traditional TINA-mantra 
emphasizing in his speech that they “had no alternatives”, than continuing austerity is the only 
option, a way which “is difficult” and without “margin for slipping”. Furthermore, “these policies 
cannot change if governments will change” (a reason for participation of the other parties) it cannot 
“be permitted that policies would change” as else the “sacrifices the Portuguese have made the last 
years would be wasted”. 
Formal Legitimation 
The core of the democratic legitimation of the governments policies is still based on democratic 
procedures. In his speech, Passos Coelho he appeals to Portugal’s “history of democracy” and 
explicitly states that his government is “mandated by the Portuguese people to win the national 
emergency” and it is “supported in the national assembly by two parties in a cohesive coalition”. “In 
the interest of the nation”, he said, the austerity will continue to have “the legitimacy that the 
Portuguese people and constitution have conferred to me”. 
He frames the austerity policies as a “democratic state of law that respects its institutions”, with a 
government “sharing the constitutional values”. Nevertheless he restricts the scope of any 
democratic influence by stating that “the program binds the whole state and evidently the all its 
sovereign institutions”. The democratic legitimacy of alternative policies on the other hand, is 
doubted”, as  it “would risk the great national consensus (about Europe) that lasts since 35 years”, 
and  “would condemn the project for its society that Portugal ambitioned for itself when it 
consolidated its democracy.”  
While Europe and the IMF Portugal under strong pressure, it seems the Portuguese government 
continues its role as the "best pupil of Europe" to want to play. Although the Prime Minister declared 
the decision of the court to respect, "as it should be in a law," he however know the ruling inter alia 
expressed by "a lack of realism" in the court, that it "ignores the circumstances ", the ruling in the 
future, lead to the" questioning of key values in the Constitution ", and "serious consequences for 
the country ". However, he stated that Portugal made agreements with the Troika and would fulfill 
them completely. He added that after the judgment is no alternative than to further cut in the public 
sector. 
IV The representative of the Troika 
 
The last case of this study is based on a personal interview with one of the high representatives of 
the Troika in Portugal. This interview has been taken the last day of the seventh Troika evaluation in 
Lisbon in April 2013. Various points of this interview should be highlighted. As could be expected, this 
representative hid behind a very technical discourse. What struck me immediately was the lack of 
knowledge of and personal relation with the political and social situation of the country. The 
technical background of these highly qualified officers of international institutions, allows such 
ignorance of the social reality to be considered acceptable, as it translates the countries problems in 
what are considered objective economic statistics. He felt very uneasy with questions about 
democratic legitimacy of the measures; various times during the interview stating that he is not the 
person to answer to these questions, asking for more technical questions. At the same time, there 
was a kind of self-censorship about sensitive issues, such as structural problems of the Eurozone, 
expressed by silences. 
This brings us to the following elements that consist his discourse on democratic legitimacy of the 
Troika and Governments policies. These can also be divided in a neoliberal and a democratic 
element. 
Depolitization 
According to the official, the crisis was the consequence of “drying up of financing flows” and the 
policies were design to meet the need to “reduce their imbalances”. At the same time the austerity 
program is portrayed as a help to “try and to provide temporary financing”, to relieve the pain. At the 
same time the “program has sought to protect the minimum levels of benefits, the minimum levels 
of pensions,”it “ensures … the social protection is at the core helping the poor”; portraying the anti-
social character of austerity would thus be “unfair”. He states that the political debate is too much “a 
little bit of a blame game”. 
At the same time, he portrays the role Troika of the  as a-political and good-governance advice: “we 
form judgments on what is reasonable and what is not reasonable”. The troika only gives “technical 
assistance” and gives advice on “what kind of financing there is” . This also means that the political 
decision is restricted to “how you get there” which is “ultimately  a decision that has to come from 
here (the national government)” as long as it “was reasonable”. The political debate however  
Formal Legitimation 
He admits that the crisis and the necessity of austerity “puts a strain on the political discourse” and it 
“puts a strain on the body politic”. Policies are restricted due to “very limited budgetary tools”. 
However, to his surprise “the insitutions are still in place”; “The democratic institutions  remain in 
place; If we think in terms of parliament, freedom of speech, constitutional court check, checks and 
balances ...”. It is “normal” that people protest, but as long as the “numbers are endorsed by 
parliament”, where he is even surprised of “how broad-based consensus there has been”, 
acknowledging that this is “something that stands Portugal well”. 
There is no problem for the democratic legitimacy, which he considers as “relatively healthy”. 
Furthermore, “the adoption of the fiscal compact”, “and of course the annual budget, are approved 
and ratified by parliament”. As long as “the government democratically elected”, according to this 
official we cannot see an opposition “between technocracy and democracy”. 
Conclusions 
 
In the beginning of this text we drawed a theoretical framework about the co-existence of capitalism 
and democracy, and the conflict between those. Based on a dialectic materialist analysis this paper 
defenden that the tension between legitimation and accumulation, - which is the base for the 
reproduction of every capitalist society -  leads to legitimacy crises of democracy and a struggle 
about the very meaning of the concept of democracy. 
We applied this to the situation of Portugal within the Euro crisis, and observed different narratives 
about democracy, as the protestors tend to have a substantive discourse of democracy; the political 
economic elite has a neoliberal formalist approach. This paper developed a deeper analysis of the 
latter discourse. In this discourse, 2 tendencies to restrict the public influence could be observed 
within democratic discourse.These tendencies, are a limitation of the public sphere through a 
tendency of depolitization, culturalization, privatization and lack of alternatives on the one hand. On 
the other hand we see a limitation of democracy within the public sphere itslef through the 
limitation of deocratic discourse by the executive to formalist procedures. These tendencies have 
been strengtened during the social conflict and the implementation of the austerity measures. 
In the 4 enigmatic cases we discussed in this article we observed various elements from the theory. A 
first one is a clear element of depolitization; present in the TINA-discourse, the irrationalization of 
political alternatives, the technocracy of the IMF-official. Another one is the appeal to formal 
democratic procedures, formally respecting them in the case of the constitutional court, but at the 
same time trying to avoid any substantive influence, the defense of the ministers against the 
grandoladas.  
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